Serial No.: 10/575,524

Final Office Action dated: March 11, 2010

Supplemental Response to Final Office Action dated: September 3, 2010

Second Supplemental Response to Final Office Action dated: December 16, 2010

## **AMENDMENTS TO THE CLAIMS**

Please replace all previous versions of the claims with the following listing:

- (Cancelled)
  (Cancelled)
  (Cancelled)
  (Cancelled)
  (Cancelled)
  (Cancelled)
  (Cancelled)
- 7. (Currently Amended) A method of avoiding improper machine activation by machine control parameters of a multi-axis machine tool, comprising:

assigning a private encryption key and a private decryption key to a sender of the machine control parameters using a hardware processor an improper-activation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool of a computer system, wherein the private encryption key is different from the private decryption key and is provided for the decoding;

encoding the machine control parameters intended for the multi-axis machine tool to obtain first-encoded machine control parameters using the hardware processor improper-activation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool and the private decryption key that is assigned to a sender;

providing the first-encoded machine control parameters with a sender identification of a sender using the hardware processor improper-activation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool;

encoding the first-encoded machine control parameters <u>by the multi-axis</u> <u>machine tool</u> to obtain second-encoded machine control parameters using the

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hardware processor improper-activation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool and an encryption key that is assigned to the multi-axis machine tool;

decoding the second-encoded machine control parameters to obtain first-decoded machine control parameters using the hardware processor improperactivation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool and a decryption key that is assigned to the multi-axis machine tool, wherein the decryption key is different from the encryption key and is provided for the decoding;

authenticating a sender based on a sender identification and a suitability of the encryption key assigned to the sender for <u>further decoding</u> the first-decoded machine control parameters using the <u>hardware processor</u> <u>improperactivation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool</u>;

if a sender is authenticated, decoding the first-decoded machine control parameters to obtain second-decoded machine control parameters using the hardware processor improper-activation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool and the encryption key assigned to a sender;

checking whether the machine control parameters were actually generated for [[said]]the multi-axis machine tool using the hardware processor improperactivation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool; and

determining whether a module associated with a sender which generated the machine control parameters is actually suitable and authorized to do so using the hardware processor improper-activation safety module in the multi-axis machine tool.

- 8. (Cancelled)
- 9. (Cancelled)
- 10. (Cancelled)
- 11. (Cancelled)
- 12. (Cancelled)

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25. (Cancelled)

26. (Cancelled)

27. (Cancelled)